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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

MIGUEL ANGEL FLORES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970215-CA
Priority No. 2

:

ARGUMENT
I.

THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AND DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ARSON.

Despite the troublesome degree of inconsistency within the
accomplice

testimony

that

serves

as

the

sole

basis

for

the

aggravated arson conviction of Flores, the State maintains that the
evidence is "more than sufficient to support" the jury's verdict.
State's Brief ("S.B.") at 17. The State argues that the accomplice
testimonies of Wanda Fox ("Fox"), Melissa Chacon ("Chacon"), David
Samora ("Samora"), and Gustave Dutson ("Dutson") "collectively and
consistently

[established]

defendant's

involvement in the [aggravated arson]." 1

knowing

and

intentional

S.B. 20. The State also

relies upon the accounts of the accomplices to demonstrate that the
elements of aggravated robbery have been satisfied.

Id. at 20-21.

The State glosses over two fundamental problems which render

1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1995) provides:

(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of
fire or explosives he intentionally and unlawfully damages:
(a) a habitable structure; or
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a
participant in the offense is in the structure or vehicle.
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree.

the

evidence

insufficient:

(1)

The

prosecution

gained

the

accomplices' statements in exchange for grants of immunity and/or
beneficial plea bargains, except for Fox, who was not charged at
all despite her admitted involvement in the conspiracy to bomb the
house.2

R. 131 [144,155,158,199] , 132 [247] ; see also Appellant's

Brief ("A.B.") at 17-21; (2) The testimonies of the accomplices are
not

so

consistent

or

justified in this case.

conclusive

that

the

jury's

verdict

was

A.B. 21-25; see also State v. Quada, 918

P.2d 883, 887, cert, denied 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996) ("evidence is
insufficient where, viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict,

[it]

x

is

sufficiently

inconclusive

or

inherently

improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt

that the defendant

committed the crime of which he was

convicted'") (quotation omitted).
The State initially takes issue with the cases relied on by
Flores, particularly United States v. Yoakam, 116 F.3d 1346, 134950 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Earl, 27 F.3d 423, 425-26
(9th Cir. 1994); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 194-98 (Utah 1987);

2

The State asserts that Flores incorrectly intimated in
his opening brief that Fox received some sort of leniency in
exchange for her testimony. See S.B. 27. However, Flores does
not make such a representation and, in fact, acknowledges that
Fox was not even charged in the incident and did not receive
leniency in exchange for her testimony. See A.B. 18. Hence, the
State's characterization of Flores' brief is incorrect.
The State makes several more allegations that Flores
misrepresents or improperly draws from the record. See S.B. 2930, 31 n.10, 32. Flores does not misrepresent the record,
however. Rather, Flores, like the State, accurately cites to the
record and draws legitimate inferences therefrom in order to
present his argument to this Court. The State's accusation,
therefore, is unfounded.
2

and State v. Pratt, 475 P.2d 1013, 1014 (Utah 1970).
28; see A.B. 15-17.

See S.B. 22-

The State urges that the "facts of this case

do not exhibit inconsistencies remotely akin to those of Walker,
Pratt, Earl, and Yoakam. " S.B. 24. The State does not explain how
these cases are distinguishable.
The

evidentiary

concerns

resonate here, however.

in

the

aforementioned

cases

Specifically, the inconsistencies in the

accomplice testimony are similar to those of the uncorroborated
informant testimony in Earl which rendered the evidence in that
case too "insubstantial" to support the verdict for possession.
See Earl, 27 F.3d at 425.

For example, the Earl informant claimed

that he discussed the drug deal with a suspect in the kitchen of
the

reputed

"drug house," then changed

discussion occurred in the front room.

his

story

Id. at 425.

to

say the

At trial, he

implicated only the defendant, whereas minutes earlier he testified
that several people were involved.

Id.

Finally, the informant

simultaneously claimed that he was and then was not involved in the
drug deal.
The

Id.
accomplice

testimony

here

exhibits

similar

inconsistencies which render the evidence too "insubstantial" to
support the aggravated arson conviction.
accomplices
assembly.

expressed

Id.

For example, the

confusion about the details of the bomb

Dutson claimed he used bottles laying around the Fox

apartment; Chacon claimed Samora gathered the bottles from outside;
Samora denied gathering the bottles at all.
132 [223] ; A.B. 24.

R. 131 [132,169] ,

Moreover, Fox and Chacon gave contradictory
3

testimony about their involvement.

On the one hand, Fox and Chacon

claimed to not know that four King Mafia Disciples

("KMD") were

assembling bombs, yet Fox admitted to procuring gasoline and Chacon
admitted buying masks and gloves. R. 131 [119,136-37,196] ; A.B. 2324.

Finally, the accomplice testimony was contradictory about

Flores7 presence at the Fox apartment.

Samora stated that he did

not remember whether Flores was present; Dutson, Chacon and Fox had
only vague memories about others present, but definitely remembered
Flores.

R. 131 [124,171,183] , 132 [122] ; A.B. 22.

Hence, as in

Earl, the evidence against Flores is contradictory and, therefore,
"insubstantial."
corroborative

27 F.3d at 425.

evidence

linking

Moreover, there is no other

Flores

to

the

crime.

Id.

Accordingly, the aggravated arson conviction is not supported by
sufficient evidence.

Id.

The instant case is also similar to Yoakam, where the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a conviction for insufficient
evidence.

116

F.3d

at

1350.

In Yoakam,

the

defendant

was

convicted of arson, the circumstantial evidence against him being
his involvement in a business deal and his presence in the building
just

prior

acknowledged
reversed

to

the

fire.

Id.

at

1349.

The

Yoakam

Court

that there was sufficient evidence of arson, but

the conviction because there was not enough

linking defendant to the crime.

Id.

evidence

The court reasoned that

neither Yoakam's presence nor his association in the business deal
was enough to convict him of arson.

Id. at 1349-50.

Consequently,

the Court held that the jury's guilty verdict must have been the
4

improper "product of speculation and conjecture."

Id.

As in Yoakam, Flores' mere association with and presence
among other KMD members gathered at the Fox apartment does not
establish his guilt where the evidence against him is otherwise
insubstantial.

116 F.3d at 1350.

"Mere presence . . . may create

suspicion, but

it does not establish participation or guilt."

United States v. Leos-Ouiiada, 107 F.3d 786, 796 (10th Cir. 1997);
see also A.B. 19-20 (discussing how Flores' presence with KMD may
mislead jury into basing guilty verdict on association alone).
Moreover,

the

evidence

suggests

that

Flores

was

at

the

Fox

apartment to attend a party, rather than as an accomplice to the
conspiracy.
testimony

See A.B. 20-22.

Hence, the conflicting accomplice

indicates such a level of insubstantiality

that the

jury's verdict must have been the improper result of "speculation
or conjecture."

Yoakam, 116 F.3d at 1350; see also Pratt, 475 P.2d

at 1014 (witness testimony was so "self-contradictory, vague and
uncertain" that

it was insufficient

to connect defendant with

wrongdoing)3; see, e.g. , Walker, 743 P. 2d at 195
evidence

that

defendant

was

triable

(insufficient

as adult where

testimony

thereto consisted of contradictory and uncorroborated testimony of
mother of child sex abuse victim).
3

The State asserts that Pratt is not authoritative in this
case because it was decided under Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953
as amend.), the predecessor to section 77-17-7 requiring other
evidence to corroborate accomplice testimony. See S.B. 24 n.7.
Pratt is instructive, however, to the extent that it illustrates
how the evidence in support of a conviction must be sufficiently
consistent and clear, regardless of whether it consists of
accomplice testimony alone or other independent evidence. 475
P.2d at 1014.
5

The State also challenges Flores' brief on the ground that
Utah

has

"abandoned

skepticism

regarding

to

a

considerable

uncorroborated

extent

witness

its

historical

testimony

when

it

enacted Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-1 (1982), providing for conviction
on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice."

S.B. 25.

Even

though the law now allows for a conviction on this basis, this fact
does not dispense with the need to ensure that such evidence,
especially uncorroborated accomplice testimony, is substantial and
credible.
upon

See Earl, 27 F.3d at 425 (federal conviction may be had

uncorroborated

accomplice

testimony

if

credible

and

substantial) (citing United States v. Lai, 944 F.2d 1434, 1440 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S.Ct. 947 (1992)).

Accordingly, this

Court must still review the uncorroborated accomplice testimony
with caution notwithstanding the enactment of section 77-17-7.
The State further asserts that the leniency-for-testimony
factor

does

"emphatically

not

present

a

and convincingly

concern
testified

because

the

witnesses

that their

agreements

required their truthful testimony, that they risked prison if they
did lie under oath, and that they were, in fact, telling the
truth."

S.B. 27.

The State adds that the jury was instructed to

regard with caution the accomplice testimony received in exchange
for leniency.

S.B. 28; see also R. 65, 66 (jury instructions nos.

8 and 9 ) .
The State overvalues the accomplices' emphatic declarations
that they are speaking truth, especially where such testimony is
routinely regarded with caution. Oaths indicate a measure of truth
6

- """l|

to the extent that their purpose :
consci?"-"1

>-- ^or

.\ . .

-,-,

..

HI,,, I I i I |,L. attiant

legal obligation to tell the

sons v. Barnes, 8 71 P. 2d 5 If.

±d 513 U.S. 5f
not d

1994) (quotation

o

^

s?n (lit ah l^'i

I I « «l

oaths are

IIM^^I,

, -^-^ witnesses may be prone to at

least embellish th- truth to suit their

purpose?

State v. Nielsen, ^27 P.2d n'~
misrepresented :i i\

i

e,

c.a.,

_L Knowingly

.amor* _x ^ffiaavx-L

secure search warrant

and again under oat n at defendant's prel im" ^=^v hc^rina' .* see a ^ ^
Qib P. 2d ^"

State v. Virrar^

never

truth

simple

quoting

Ernest, Act li ,

Importance of i

Oscar

TV,

~' ^ * "^ 1 ihc~"

testimony ^° narticu" v
rect.vxiiJ

-i.iency

Cir

Llicii

; T<

^ ~

.

. ..- .

_o tabricate or mold

escape prosecution

(citations o m ^ 1 ' 0

the

-

"raises ---; •

Torr1

t h e a c c o m p l i c e s ^t-t-*
cillnvidte

awVi

^ c ^ United States v. Isaac, 134 F.3d ". 9 Q «'*-:

testimony

sentences")

'

The

.r:e accomplices are

(accomplice testimony

problems since the"

Wilde,

._ ,...

concerns

arising

from

[or] lighten their
,:

-

..at

statements does not

i;:;^ leniency-for-testimony

exchanges.
_ ,._ .* pleat _-^. -^ ^ o ple« bargains„

While the instructions alerted the

jury to the credibility concerns inherent
the

4,,

rv was

-.^eviate the concerns

t=p.j.

ny,

he assumption that "birds of a

feather are flocked together" and, therefore, Flores must have been
7

guilty despite the insubstantiality of the accomplices' testimony.
See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454, 69 S.Ct. 716,
93 L.Ed. 790 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (finding "naive" the
assumption that prejudicial effects of accomplice testimony can be
overcome by cautionary instruction)

(citing Blumenthal v. United

States, 332 U.S. 539, 68 S.Ct. 248, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1947); Skidmore
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948)).

Hence,

the jury, unable to divorce themselves from their assumptions, may
have been inclined to convict Flores despite the instruction.
Finally, the State claims the inconsistency in the testimony
is

"immaterial"

alongside

the

"mass

of

consistent

material

evidence" and the corroborating testimony of the investigators.
S.B.

28-33.

The State downplays several discrepant areas and

suggests that although the accomplices gave varying accounts, it is
enough that they all agreed that Flores was present and that he was
responsible.

Id.

As discussed supra and in his opening brief,

significant questions exist regarding material facts given the
inconsistent statements of Fox, Chacon, Dutson, and Samora.
A.B. 21-25.

See

The varying testimonies represent a troublesome degree

of fabrication, ultimately bringing into question the accomplices7
claims

of

Flores'

involvement.

Id. at

25.

When viewed

in

combination with their motives to tailor their testimony based on
the

plea

bargain

arrangements,

the

inconsistent

accomplice

testimony is too insubstantial to support Flores' conviction.

Id. ;

see also Ouada, 918 P.2d at 887 (jurors must have had reasonable
doubt where evidence is exceedingly inconclusive). Hence, contrary
8

to the state's assertion
consi^4--

""he evidf^r—- - *•

_^ :-; so

. siscencies become "immaterial "

Moreover, such inconsistencies cannot be dismissed sirr".
because each accomplice manaaec
Arc- •*•

- ...

::e crime.

.evitaJDiy implicates the defendant :in trial

and, therefore, raises credibility concerns
U.S. at 4^4

(disc^ssino ~-

;-:,

- Krulewit^

•-•

provides "some

...gc„.»g" ana n^w jurors then easily assume defendant

y u n t y by association)

,s noted by the Utah Supreme "'

acknowledged by the State,
11

iice may be motivated to falsify because
OL a
to blame someone else in connection with
the crime; or in the hope of obtaining leniency; or
the very fact that he is involved in the crime may
tend to impair his credibility.
These combine tc
justify looking upon his testimony with rant-inn •*
State \

^,

,-+ "~

.. . .

Given i nc weaknesses inherent in accomplice testimony,

the fact that each accomplice
with

•• •

.quotation omitted) ;

*

1 rr 1

^ i ?atcJ *

'Zdttzri . v-. _

;

bpense

. ^i.L^ot^ncy *.. .ne.r testimony

in cr .- , . ,.^ sustain Flores' conviction.4
The "corroborating" testimonie>
Payn^ a:

~ rf-•<=.-

lw

"

:

'"£.-LiJaL

, .err

_w.w . otidjjiiitate the weaknesses

inherent in the accomplice testimony. Primarily, the investigators

4

Although section 77-17-1 allows for conviction based on
the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices, such testimony must
Still be consistent and substantial to support the conviction.
kence, language from Ross remains instructive although it was
decided prior to the enactment of section 77-17-1 to the extent
that it explains the credibility concerns inherent in accomplice
testimony.

had no knowledge of the culprits of the arson.

R. 132[253-292] .

The State Crime Lab did not discover any identifiable fingerprints
on any of the bottles.

R. 132 [288] . The investigators7 testimony

only established that the fire was caused by arson and that four
incendiary devices

(molotov cocktails) were used based on the

presence of broken beer bottles, soaked rags and the smell of
gasoline permeating the air.

R. 132[257-63,272-92]. None of this

information implicates Flores in the crime, however, and therefore
does not corroborate the accomplice testimony to such an extent
that

the

inconsistencies

in

the

accomplice

testimony

become

"immaterial."
II.

THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING REMARK IS IMPROPER AND
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE HARMFUL ERROR.

The State urges that the prosecutor's closing reference to
victims "burning to death" is not improper and, at any rate, does
not constitute harmful, reversible error.
A.

See S.B. 33-43.

The Prosecutor's Remark Is Improper.

In defense of the prosecutor's remark, the State disregards
the fact that the judge sustained Flores' objection, indicating
that the trial court itself found the statement to be improper.
R. 132 [326] .
"reasonable
importance

Instead, the State asserts that the comment was a
rebuttal"

of the

to

defense

State's

comment

case to Flores, and a reasonable

"supported by the evidence."
The

counsel's

argument

on

the

inference

S.B. 37, 40.
strays

determining the propriety of a remark:

far

from

the

test

for

a remark is proper so long

as it does not call to the jury's attention matters not properly
10

considered in determininq the ve.r:1.'
P.2~-

*~~

Sec ouctLe v. vaidez, 513

.o aiscussed

full>

'

his

opening

or let, the prosecutor's vivid closing reference *-^ victimr
to death" amounted <-n inadmissih"1
exr'Md^
given

..wc.u^ -=^-j, 'ji.d- r

its

propensity

improperly suggest
T--JI

to

7uu P,2a 1106, 11
some obligation be"

\ •-

the
"that

-i-i^r

c-

See A.B. 27-32; see also State v. Smith,
('remarks ^ - m e s "
^

:
improper).

inadmissibility
th

th^

(1998^,

-^ jiven the near-

"Ttah 1985)

;.-i:u^.^,"
regarding

inflame

./aence i j u t m e l y

- .s of Evidence

"hat

c;.::;s.

obvious

-,

ne gu-^t -i innocence

"Given -he clarity of the law"
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-nproper.

See Vaidez
The State's argument
counsel,

particularly

likewise ignores the Drincio'l

prosecutors

--..-v

:.es

^.

:
uhe

• State cites to State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450 (Utah
1982;, ^xx asserting that a similar prosecutorial reference to the
possible injury to the victim was deemed appropriate and,
therefore, the instant remark is also proper. Williams is
distinguishable from the instant case, however, with regard to
tihe nature of the comment and the quality of the evidence against
the defendant. See A . B . 33-35. Accordingly, the State's
reliance on Williams i s misplaced.
11

government, are duty-bound

to honor the boundaries of

closing

argument and present their summations with a mind to seek justice
and not simply to secure a conviction.6

See Emmett, 83 9 P. 2d at

787 (discussing prosecutor's heightened duty to refrain from overzealous argument) ; see also Andreason, 718 P. 2d at 402 (counsel has
broad latitude in closing but boundaries must be observed).
Bearing in mind the boundaries of closing argument, as well
as the general exclusion of victim impact evidence, the remark
cannot be justified as a reasonable rebuttal to defense counsel's
reference

to

the

importance

of

the

case

to Flores.

Defense

counsel, at the close of his summation, reminded the jury of its
important duty to impartially decide the case when he stated, "for
Miguel Flores, this is [the] most important [trial] . " R. 132 [319] .
He did not mention the victims and did not dwell on the point
beyond the one sentence.

Id.

The prosecutor, however, went beyond

the boundaries of permissible rebuttal when he named each resident
individually and stated that they "came close to burning to death."
R. 132 [325] .
the door

Nothing in defense counsel's single sentence opened

to such vivid victim

impact

evidence, especially

in

reference to an event that did not happen and where defense counsel
did not argue at length about the importance of the case to Flores.
C.f.

State

v.

Bowman,

945

P.2d

6

153,

157

(Utah

App.

1997)

The State mischaracterizes Flores' reliance upon this
principle as an endorsement of per se reversible error. See S.B.
42-43. Nothing in Flores' opening brief would suggest this and,
in fact, Flores refers to the principle merely as a
"consideration" for the court in deciding the issue of
prosecutorial misconduct. See A.B. 26.
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As an initial matter, the evidence against Flores is not

"overwhelming" as the State suggests.

Id. at 42.

As noted in

Point I supra and in his opening brief, A.B. 12-25, the evidence
against

Flores

consists

solely

of

the

inconsistent

and

uncorroborated testimony of accomplices, all but one exchanging
testimony for beneficial plea agreements and/or immunity.

Where

the evidence is so inconclusive, the likelihood that the jury is
improperly influenced by a prosecutor's remark is great.
v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah 1986).

See State

The Andreason Court

explained,
[w]hen the evidence in the record is
sufficiently conflicting, jurors are more likely
influenced by an improper argument.
In such
instances, they are more susceptible
to the
suggestion that factors other than the evidence
before them should determine a defendant's guilt or
innocence. . . . In view of [] highly marginal . . .
evidence . . . , a reasonable likelihood exists that
in the absence of the prosecutor's prejudicial
argument, there might have been a different result.
Id.

By the same token, the jurors in the instant case were likely

influenced toward conviction by the prosecutor's appeal to the
victims ordeal given that the evidence was otherwise conflicting
and insubstantial.
The State further claims that the prosecutor's remark was
harmless

since

he

"only

briefly

commented

on

the

victims'

circumstances, and in accord with the trial court's ruling, moved
on and concluded his argument."
did

not

cease

his

S.B. 40. Actually, the prosecutor

commentary.

After

the

judge

spoke,

the

prosecutor reiterated, "I simply make the point that this is an
important

case.

We expect

and we are certain

conscientiously perform your duty."
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that you will

R. 132 [326] . In so doing, the

reference

to the victims v/ap echoed

court'

-spire

nhe

o^, see also A.b. 36. Hence, the

prosecutor

did

u t immediately

quit

u

: s argument

and

thereby

mitigate the harm resultina therefr^r,
yeixai -.instruction7 and the twc written
instructions", Ficres notes ir. his openina bri^f that cautionary
instructions are r-^ alwavs e f ^ ^
b

' •^-
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^ci
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.keiihood that the prejudice was not
overcome by the instructions is heightened given tharagainst

Flores

is weak

cnererore,

--n-:
wcie

mere

susceptible to an improper reference to victim impact testimony.
See supra Point
where the evident

12-25.
*

Given the suaaes-

, MIL i,tn,«< iv. -_.. le-ct oi .he instruction

^jequaie.
Finally, the State asserts that tl--~
given the trial , ,

ubervanori L.^L the jurors did not

Upon Flores' objection ,^, uhe prosecutor's ieniaijv, ^*ie
juuy
" "I am going to sustain the objection. The jury has
been
lud that statements of counsel are not evidence and
they are not to consider them as evidence." T? 1 ^ r ^ c l
8

insurucu-w** xiumbex J> bidies in pertinent part, "You are
to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in this trial
and the law as stated to you by me. The law forbids you to be
governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." R. 58.
Instruction number 4 provides in part, "Statements and
arguments of counse1 ire not evidence in the case." R. 60.

seem to be phased by the comment.

See S.B. 41-42.

Even though the

court did so find, this does not in-and-of-itself wholly mitigate
the harm caused by the remark.9

There are many reasons why a juror

may not display his or her emotional response to a provocative
statement, including fatigue (the prosecutor made the remark at the
end of a two-day trial filled with lengthy witness testimony),
respect for the decorum of the court and the impartial role of the
jury, or out of a sense of gravity of the idea of the deaths of the
victims.

This does not, however, necessarily mean that the remark

did not register a response among the jurors.

Given the many

concerns otherwise arising from the comment (see supra; A.B. 2538) , the fact that the jurors did not appear to overtly react
should not dispense with the harmfulness analysis here.
III.

FLORES' PLEA AGREEMENT IS LEGALLY INVALID
SINCE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CONDUCT AN
ADEQUATE COLLOQUY UNDER RULE 11.

A.

This Court Has Jurisdiction Over This Matter
Since The Trial Court's Noncompliance With
Rule 11 Constitutes Plain Error.

The State asserts that this Court lacks jurisdiction over
9

The State relies on State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368
(Utah 198 9), in which the Supreme Court held that a witness'
inadvertent comment about the defendant's parole officer was not
prejudicial where the trial court noted, in part, that the
"statement was lost on the jury" and "it observed no visible
reaction of the jurors to the testimony." Id. at 1373. The
State's reliance on Williams is misplaced since the prejudicial
comment at issue there made no direct reference to the defendant
or any of his previous crimes, and it was not clear that the
parole officer referred to was that of the defendant. Id. The
instant remark, by contrast, is not as innocuous; the prosecutor
here tolled the name of each resident, then conjured an horrific
image in the jurors minds of the victims "burning to death."
Unlike the comment in Williams, the prosecutor's remark could not
have been easily lost on the jurors. Id.
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See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah lyuv)
(reviewing court will not review guilty plea for first time on
appeal; defendant must first move to withdraw plea in trial
court, then, if unsuccessful, appeal from trial court's denial);
see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995) (defendant must move to
withdraw guilty plea within thirty days afi-pr omt-^ 3:1

_ne state aadiL±undiiy m
~^-- . •>„- Flores has "failed
to allege that the trial court cu. . ced p . a m error." S.B. 44.
A review of Utah cases concerning review of plea agreements under
a Rule 11 / plain error analysis reveals that defendants have
not; historically, presented their argument under the heading of
"plain error." Rather, it has been sufficient that a defendant
Establishes from the record that the trial
did not comply
with Rule 11. In so doing, the defendant n.
z the appropriate
"plain error" showing. See, e.g., Pharris, 798 P.2d at 774-78
(finrHna n ^ ^ error based on defendant's discussion of colloquy

the appropriate procedure is to remand the case to the trial court
in order to allow the defendant to move for withdrawal of the plea.
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311-12.
Where the trial court in the instant case failed to comply
with Rule 11 in ensuring the knowing

and voluntary

nature

of

Flores' plea (see infra Point III.B.; A.B. 38-44), Flores' claim
amounts to plain error and is, therefore, properly before this
Court.

Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311.
B.

The Guilty Plea Is Legally Invalid Since The
Trial Court Did Not Comply With Rule 11.

The State asserts that the colloquy conducted by the judge,
combined

with

possibility

of

the

plea

affidavit

consecutive

informing

sentencing,

Flores

satisfies

the

compliance" standard for Rule 11 set forth in Gibbons.
45-49; see also Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314.
v.

Maguire,

830

P.2d

216

(Utah

1991),

of

the

"strict
See S.B.

The State cites State
a per curiam

decision

indicating that a trial court may establish the voluntariness of a
plea through use of the plea affidavit along with the colloquy.
Id.; Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217-18 n.2 (criticizing State v. Dastrup,
818 P.2d 594 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1992), which held that trial court may not rely on affidavit).
Even assuming that Maguire controls, the plea affidavit
alongside the colloquy in the instant case does not establish that
shortcomings); Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242 (finding plain error
although defendant did not explicitly outline "plain error"
analysis). Hence, Flores' claim should not be dismissed, as the
state asserts, for lack of a "plain error" analysis. Flores'
discussion of the trial court's failure to comply with Rule 11
adequately briefs the argument.
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versus

.-Hough court recessed for a

moment w:^.^.c-. Flores and his attorney spoke privately
did not
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« ^..attu, "I don't w a n : to do
also A.jb. 41 4 3

concurrent sent>

*- .-----, .

^ . established that

to Flores

understood its terms, and immediately ucon

itself

plea

v. at 217 (quoting State v. Smith, 812 P. 2d 4 7 0,

The record
counsel

^: • omissions

-ffidavit must be r*]-~i fi& "

Jtah App. 199

(ieieiibe

therein]

^

•-•^ ~~urt
.ovious

The affidavit reads in pertinent part that "the sen/ten^
may be consecutd ve " n

misgivings about the affidavit.

Rather, the court merely inquired

whether Flores spoke with his attorney, and then stated for the
record that "Flores has had an opportunity to discuss some matters
with [his attorney] . . . [and] has executed the statement of the
defendant."

R. 101 [8-9] .

Where the affidavit contains the critical language regarding
the possibility of consecutive sentencing, it was incumbent upon
the court, at the moment of Flores' verbalized doubt, to conduct a
more probing colloquy to clarify " % any uncertainties raised in the
course of the plea colloquy.'"
Smith, 812 P.2d at 477).

Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217 (quoting

The court's shallow inquiry, however,

fell short of establishing Flores' knowing and voluntary acceptance
of the terms of the plea where the court did no more than ascertain
that Flores talked to his attorney.

See Gibbons, 740 P. 2d at 1313

("[t]rial courts may not rely on defense counsel . . .
the specific concerns of Rule 11(e)").

to satisfy

Accordingly, the trial

court did not satisfy the Gibbons "strict compliance" test and the
plea is, therefore, invalid.
The fact that the trial court later stated that it was not
bound by the prosecutor's sentencing "recommendations" does not
fulfill its duty.13

As noted in Flores' opening brief, the court

13

The trial court stated: "Do you understand that I've
heard some of the recommendations from the prosecutor today
relative to sentencing? Do you understand that those
recommendations are not binding on me; in other words, I will
listen to them carefully, I will consider them, but I'm not
required to follow them?"
Flores responded in the affirmative. R. 101 [14].
20

never articulated the words "consecutive" or "concurrent," nor did
it explain the "possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences" in lay terms that Flores would understand.
Crim. P. 11(e)(5); see also A.B. 41-43.

Utah R.

Moreover, the court's

reference was not a direct response to either the prosecutor's
recommendation for "concurrent" sentencing or Flores7 verbalized
misgivings regarding the affidavit.

Rather, the court made its

statement towards the end of the plea hearing.

Hence, Flores

likely did not make the mental connection and remained confused
about the terms of the plea concerning consecutive sentencing.
Accordingly, the court did not fulfill its duty under Rule 11 and
Gibbons to ensure that Flores entered the plea knowingly and
voluntarily.14

Accordingly, this Court should vacate the murder

14

The State asserts that Flores7 confusion in this case
was not compounded by the fact that Flores anticipated concurrent
sentencing. See S.B. 43 n.14. The State also claims that
Flores7 hope for concurrent sentencing is "unfounded" given that
Flores acknowledged that the prosecutor fulfilled his promise to
suggest concurrent sentencing and that the plea affidavit
informed Flores of the possibility of consecutive sentencing.
Id.
Flores7 hopes for more lenient treatment are not rendered
"unfounded" simply because he acknowledged the prosecutor's
fulfillment of his promise, nor because the affidavit asserted
the possibility of consecutive sentencing. Even though Flores
was never promised concurrent sentencing, both the affidavit and
the prosecutor planted the seed of hope in his mind that such may
be possible notwithstanding any disclaimers that the court was
not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation. This hope, even
though non-binding on the court, can be one of the most
compelling considerations when a defendant decides to enter a
plea. Coupled with an inadequate colloquy, such hope may blind
the defendant to the reality that it may not be realized. Hence,
Flores7 hope for concurrent sentencing is not "unfounded" and, in
fact, is a natural human response. This said, the trial court
should have proceeded with even greater caution during the plea
colloquy to establish that Flores did not have overblown hopes of
concurrent sentencing instead of relying on the affidavit alone,
21

conviction

and

remand

withdraw the plea.

to the

trial

court

to allow

Flores

to

Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311.
CONCLUSION

Flores requests this Court to reverse his aggravated arson
conviction for insufficient evidence.

Should the Court find the

evidence sufficient, Flores requests this case to be remanded for
a new trial given the improper, harmful prosecutorial closing
remarks.

Flores additionally requests this Court to vacate his

murder conviction and remand to the trial court to allow him to
withdraw his plea.
ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant requests oral argument.
SUBMITTED this

\\

day of May, 1998.
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CATHERINE L. BEGIC
6
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

especially considering Flores' verbalized misgivings about the
affidavit.
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